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Abstract
The development of fault-detection and self-healing methods at both a hardware and software level in modern aircraft is an attractive prospect.
However it is expensive to design and test these techniques using real aircraft. This paper appraises the viability of using FlightGear, an open-
source Flight Simulator, as a test-bed for these approaches. The paper characterises the realism of various aspects of a model of the Airbus A380.
Interfaces are established to abstract critical control system routines from FlightGear. These functions are replicated in both software and hardware
environments. The control data can then be subjected to fault-injection and the control modules modiﬁed to enable fault-detection and self-healing.
By applying cluster analysis techniques to training sets of data, a fault-detection, diagnosis and self-healing model is designed to address these
injected faults. FlightGear is found to provide highly realistic simulation of aircraft systems and instrumentation. Hardware-in-the-loop testing
shows promise as an area for future work. The proposed fault-detection model is found to provide 96% accuracy.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Programme Chair of the Fourth International Conference on Through-life Engineering Services.
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1. Main Text
On 1 June 2009 Air France Flight 447, an Airbus A330, en-
tered an aerodynamic stall and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean,
killing all 228 people on board [R]. The ﬁnal report into the ac-
cident found that the crash resulted from a succession of events
starting with an inconsistency in airspeed readings caused by
icing of the aircraft pitot tubes[1].
In this, as in over 50% of all fatal aircraft accidents, pilot
error was cited as a major contributing cause [2]. It is clear,
however, that these errors were prompted by a lack of accu-
rate information from the aircraft’s systems - the pilots were
unable to tell which instruments to trust. The icing of the pitot
tubes was evidently the root cause of the accident, further, as
was pointed out in [1] and [3], while angle of attack data was
sent back to the systems computer it was not displayed to the
pilots. The display of this and other data could have allowed
them to better handle the situation [4]. It can be said that the
safe operation of an aircraft depends on the pilot or auto-pilot
receiving clear and accurate data relating to its position, orien-
tation, velocity and the forces acting upon it. When the systems
providing this information malfunction it is, at best, an incon-
venience and in the worst cases can contribute to disaster given
time and oversight.
Fault-detection is a ﬁeld of control engineering concerned
with monitoring a system and identifying when a fault has oc-
curred [5]. At the hardware level, a real-time fault-detection
approach permits the reliability of critical systems to be anal-
ysed on a second-by-second basis. If the system is suﬃciently
understood it is feasible that the causes of errors could not only
be detected but diagnosed and possibly remedied in real-time.
Fault-Detection and Self-Repair techniques could provide an
extra layer of safety tolerance in aircraft systems which allow
safety improvement without the necessity for the introduction
of expensive redundancy.
Aircraft manufacturers are particularly sensitive to change.
Poorly designed or implemented fault detection routines can
result in high rates of false-positives which can be costly and
inconvenient for passengers and airliners. Any new system
must, therefore, be tested rigorously and its performance in a
wide range of scenarios characterised. Access to real aircraft
or professional grade simulators, however, is often limited and
expensive.
This paper considers whether the open source ﬂight simula-
tor FlightGear could provide a useful test-bed for the develop-
ment of such approaches and additionally appraises its useful-
ness in hardware-in-the-loop integration. It also asks whether
fault-detection and self-healing techniques can be applied to
create an Autopilot Supervisor, oﬀering a real-time picture of
the health of key system instruments and, where faults are de-
tected, present alternative readings clearly.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the Pitot-Static system and related instrumentation from [7]
2. FlightGear
At a fundamental level the variables that a pilot is most in-
terested in are those describing the position and orientation of
the aircraft and the forces acting upon it. It is when measure-
ments of these variables go wrong that the most serious prob-
lems arise.
The fundamental variables describing the relationships be-
tween these frames of reference are deﬁned by the ﬂight dy-
namics model (FDM) used by the simulation. A number of
FDMs are availale in FlightGear. The FDM typically used is
JSBSim. It is a lightweight, non-linear Six-Degree of Freedom
(6DoF) simulation for modelling ﬂight dynamics and control
for aircraft [6].
2.1. Interfacing with FlightGear
The Property Tree is described as the "central nervous sys-
tem" of FlightGear and one of its most powerful assets. It is
an interface to low level, run time state variables stored in an
intuitive tree-like hierarchy.
2.2. Pitot-Static System
The Pitot-Static system drives several fundamental aircraft
instruments; the ASI, Altimeter and VSI, several commercial
disasters have been linked to its failure.
Mechanically the pitot-static system consists of a pitot tube,
a forward facing tube exposed to the relative wind which mea-
sures stagnation pressure, and a static pressure port, a side
mounted port which measures static pressure. These two pres-
sure measurements are then used to provide measurements of
Indicated Airspeed (IAS), Vertical speed (V/S) and Altitude
(Alt). Figure 1 demonstrates the way in which these systems
interact.
The pitot-static system is realistically modelled in Flight-
Gear. The FGSource environment module creates an environ-
mental static pressure around the aircraft from altitude lookup
tables. The pitot module update function takes the environmen-
tal pressure p, aircraft Mach speed (M), angle of attack (α) and
side-slip (β). It ﬁrst calculates a projection factor, to account
for orientation errors, as in Equation 1 [8].
X = cos(α)|cos(β)| (1)
The stagnation or pitot pressure pt is then calculated using
Equation 2 [8].
pt = p
(
1 +
(
0.2M2X2
)7/2)
(2)
The static module, accounting for errors due to side-slip and
AoA in a similar way, calculates a static port pressure ps in a
similar manner [8].
Considering the ASI: Equation 3 shows how the diﬀerence
between ps and pt provides an impact pressure qc [8].
qc = pt − ps (3)
qc is related mathematically through Equation 4 - where p0
is standard pressure at sea level and a0 is the standard speed of
sound at 15◦C - to a velocity, the IAS [8] [9].
IAS = a0
√
5
[
(
(qc)
p0
+ 1)2/7 − 1
]
(4)
The IAS is not corrected for variations, with altitude, of dy-
namic air pressure and hence does not represent the true speed
at which the aircraft is travelling through the air (TAS) and will
under-read the greater the altitude of the aircraft [10]. However
the aerodynamic behaviour of an aircraft is linked directly to
the IAS; an aircraft at any altitude will stall at the same IAS. It
is therefore critically important that it be measured accurately.
When creating a fault detection model it is important to con-
sider the modes of failure of a system. There are a number of
modes of failure of the pitot-static system and the behaviour of
the attached instrumentation will depend both on which mode
of failure occurs and what phase of ﬂight the aircraft is in. If
the pitot tube is blocked the only reading aﬀected will be IAS,
which will increase in a constant speed climb - running the risk
of aircraft stall, and decrease during descent - running the risk
of over-speed beyond critical the critical Mach number, and air-
craft breakup [11].
A blocked static port is a more serious problem than pitot
failure. Altitude measurements will become stuck, V/S will be
frozen at zero and IAS will behave in the opposite manner to
a pitot failure - showing falling IAS during a constant speed
climb and rising IAS during constant speed descent [11].
The system’s behaviour under an additional mode of fail-
ure, electronic faults, is less strictly deﬁned. The nature of
hardware-based faults means that such instances can cause er-
ratic data behaviour, even occasionally causing erroneous data
in some situations but not others. This is explored more using
real hardware in Section 3.1.
3. Fault Injection
FlightGear has some rudimentary fault injection capability.
Systems such as the Vacuum, Pitot or Static can be turned on
and oﬀ by toggling Boolean values in the FlightGear property
tree. This was insuﬃcient for the purposes of this paper and fur-
ther programming work was required to create an environment
where performance under many diﬀerent failure modes could
be tested.
As discussed in Section 2.2 there are a number of diﬀerent
modes of failure for the pitot-static system, both mechanical
and electronic [11]. In order to have the capability to model
a variety of diﬀerent kinds of fault being introduced into the
system it was necessary to turn oﬀ the native Pitot-Static calcu-
lations and replace them with custom, faulty, calculations. Us-
ing understanding of the pitot.cxx and airspeed.cxx modules,
the mathematics behind the pitot-static system, and the failure
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Fig. 2. Image of Xilinx FPGA board
Fig. 3. The eﬀect of hardware pitot fault injection
modes of the pitot static system, code was generated to inject a
number of diﬀerent types of faults. These included stuck, low,
high, drifting and noisy values.
3.1. Implementation
A custom UDP protocol, outputting from FightGear the
environmental variables used in the Pitot-Static calculations,
and taking in the results from those calculations, was created.
This permitted Pitot-Static calculations to be carried out by
re-implementing the previously developed code onto a simple
UDP server written in C. It was then possible to toggle be-
tween the (correct) on-board and (incorrect) oﬀ-board calcu-
lations from within FlightGear by switching a variable in the
property tree. In this way it was possible to insert errors into the
Pitot-Static system without changing anything within Flight-
Gear.
3.2. Hardware-In-The-Loop
The UDP connection provided further interesting options.
The abstraction from the software did not need to be limited
to another software implementation. A parallel project by an-
other student was exploring the idea of hardware-based fault-
injection and self-repair on a Xilinx FPGA platform [12]. By
lifting the pitot-tube calculation from software and implement-
ing it on the FPGA picture in Figure 2 it was possible to exper-
iment with hardware-in-the-loop testing. Faults were injected
into the hardware in a manner to simulate bombardment by
high-altitude radiation.
The eﬀect of the bit-ﬂips involved in hardware fault-
injection saw data taking extreme values, or multipliers being
applied to pitot-tube data. Figure 3 shows this phenomenon -
switching the serviceable tag from true to false causes the sub-
routine to be switched from running in the software to running
on the Xilinx board. In this case the fault on the board causes an
extremely small pitot pressure, correspondingly the measured
IAS (on the sliding left-hand axis) becomes very close to zero.
The underlined green value is the true airspeed of the aircraft
and highlights this discrepancy.
While this helped develop a more robust software-level
fault-detection package the importance of this testing was not
in the results themselves but in that it demonstrated a useful
way of quantifying and observing how hardware faults propa-
gate in a real system. FlightGear can, in this way, act as a use-
ful tool or test-bed for developing and testing hardware-based
fault-correction methods, minimising the need to use expensive
professional-grade simulators.
4. Fault-Detection, Diagnosis and Self-Healing
Error-correction requires three-phases to be carried out -
fault-detection, fault-diagnosis and ﬁnally a self-healing phase.
To appraise the results of a proposed error-correction model the
eﬀectiveness of each of these phases should be quantiﬁed.
Faults, in a model-based fault-detection system, are raised
when system values deviate signiﬁcantly from the values ex-
pected by a model. Fault-detection is typically judged by two
metrics. These are the false positive and the false negative rate,
often used interchangeably with the terms Type I and Type II
errors respectively. In the context of a ﬂying aircraft, which can
go wrong in a matter of seconds, it is also important to con-
sider the response-time - how quickly a fault ﬂag is raised after
injection.
Fault-diagnosis is the process of categorising detected faults.
The success of a fault-diagnosis method is deﬁned by the per-
centage of injected faults that are correctly identiﬁed.
Self-healing is the process of providing alternative read-
ings to instruments that are found to be faulty. The accuracy
of a self-healing method can be deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
tween the proposed alternative reading for an instrument, and
the value of that parameter were it operating normally at that
point in time. In FlightGear this can easily be measured by cre-
ating and measuring the output of fault-free duplicates of all
instruments under scrutiny.
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4.1. Modelling and Data Analysis
Time series cluster analysis is used to identify structure in
an unlabelled data set by organizing data into homogenous
groups [13]. Flight data variables consists of a regularly sam-
pled (10Hz) set of parameters. Many of these parameters are
correlated with one another and by analysing this data it is pos-
sible to detect unexpected behaviour and discrepencies. In this
instance cluster analysis was used, during a training phase, to
divide the aircraft’s systems and instrumentation time series
data into labelled faulty and non-faulty clusters. In this way,
it was hoped, a model could be developed to assign live data
in real-time to these clusters and identify those samples which
represented faulty data.
The initial time series used contained the ten parameters
obtained from ﬁve diﬀerent systems (GPS contains two pa-
rameters, Altitude and True Ground Speed (TGS)). Some pre-
processing of the data was carried out. Equations 5 and 6 show
how an estimate for a GPS derived VSI at time k was obtained,
using the real-time change in altitude δAlt and sample rate SR
in Hz. A fourth-order low-pass Butterworth ﬁlter, with coeﬃ-
cients c0 - c4 was applied to ﬁlter out noise in GPS-Altitude[14].
The ﬁlter was chosen because it was stable and performed well
under testing.
δAltk = (GPS Altk −GPS Altk−1) (5)
GPSVS Ik = SR ∗
(c0δAltk + c1δAltk−1 + ... + c4δAltk−4)
4∑
i=0
ci
(6)
Indicated Airspeed can be approximately related to True Air-
speed (TAS) by increasing it by 2% for each 1000ft increase in
altitude [10]. Equations 6 - 7 show how GPS-TGS was approx-
imated to TAS and then used, with GPS-Alt, to provide a GPS
inferred IAS (note this fails to account for wind speed).
GPS TAS ≈ GPS TGS (7)
GPS IAS ≈ GPS TAS
1 + 0.02GPS Alt1000
(8)
4.2. Variable Normalization
It is important that the variables used are of similar order
such that they have similar weight in the calculation of cluster
centroids. In order to carry out cluster analysis it was useful,
therefore, to normalize variables, creating dimensionless num-
bers representing relationships between multiple variables.
Some of these numbers were obtained heuristically - it is
fairly obvious that GPS Altitude would be expected to vary lin-
early with pressure Altitude. Others were obtained through a
combination of dimensionless analysis and examination of the
data - by looking at the rate of climb as a function of engine
speed (N1) and pitch it was possible to compare the VSI and
GPS VSI with the engine and vacuum systems. IAS is shown
to vary signiﬁcantly with GPS IAS, then a quantity represent-
ing the ratio between the two is shown to be relatively consistent
across the duration of a ﬂight.
Although many combinations of parameters were explored
in the end four normalized variables, Equations 9, 10, 11 and
12, representing correlations between seven of the ten parame-
ters initially analysed were selected. Note a multiplier has been
added in heuristically in Equation 12 to bring the mean value to
approximately 1.0.
Var1 =
IAS
GPS IAS
(9)
Var2 =
Altitude
GPS ALT
(10)
Var3 =
VS I
GPS VS I
(11)
Var4 =
4 ∗ N1 ∗ pitch
GPS VS I
(12)
4.3. k-Means Clustering
A common partitioning method, the k-means algorithm,
aims to partition a sample of data-points into a predeﬁned num-
ber of clusters, each with a mean value or centroid [15]. It
works by the minimization of an objective function, based on
the within cluster sum of squares (WCSS). Each vector in the
time series of the sample belongs to one of the clusters. The
algorithm starts by creating arbitrarily the desired number of
cluster centroids. In the assignment step each observation is
assigned to the cluster whose centroid is closest. The cluster
centroids are then updated, becoming the centroids of the sam-
ples now placed in the new clusters. The assigment phase then
recommences and the algorithm repeats until the assignments
no longer change [15].
The k-means algorithm was applied to various time series of
these normalized variables generated from test ﬂights with and
without faults injected. These clusters were then labelled, using
knowledge of the data set from which they were derived, as
"fault-free", "pitot-high", "pitot low", "static blocked" etc., and
integrated into a fault-detection model. This created an initial
set of k vectors of the co-ordinates of the centroids or means of
the clusters, m1,...,mk.
Once the system is "trained" it is used to classify new data
points. At time t, the model takes a new vector of the n normal-
ized system parameters, vt, and calculates its squared Euclidean
distance from each of the cluster centroids, as in Equation 13,
which shows the squared euclidean distance from the ith cen-
troid.
d2(vt,mi) = (vt1 − mi1 )2 + (vt2 − mi2 )2 + ... + (vtn − min )2 (13)
The vector is then assigned to the cluster to which this dis-
tance is shortest. If the latest vector has been assigned to the
"fault-free" cluster then no action will be taken, if it has been
assigned to one of the faulty clusters then an error detected ﬂag
will be raised with an associated diagnostic message and the
self-repair method will be called.
4.4. Expectation-Maximization Clustering
One problem with k-means clustering is that it forms hard,
spherical, cluster boundaries, using the Euclidean distance, that
do not account for any variation in the shape or size of the clus-
ters [16]. While this is useful for some applications, in the case
where distributions do not ﬁt these pre-deﬁned patterns it can
provide unsatisfactory results. Figure 4, showing the distribu-
tion of labelled data for Var 1 and Var 2 when a static fault is
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Fig. 4. Graph demonstrating two-dimensional K-Means Cluster Analysis
Fig. 5. Graph showing two-dimensional EM Cluster Analysis
introduced into the system, demonstrates this problem. While
the fault-free data is very tightly clustered, the labelled faulty
data set is much more broadly spread. As a result the k-means
method, despite introducing cluster centroids in sensible loca-
tions, will mis-classify a number of faulty points as being fault-
free. This results in lower detection rates and less satisfactory
performance.
An alternative to the k-means method is the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm. EM assumes samples are mem-
bers of a number of Gaussian distributions. Similar to k-means
it provides estimates of the locations of cluster centroids, repre-
senting the Gaussian means. However, in addition to the coor-
dinates of the mean, each cluster centre has an associated vector
of variances, representing the Gaussian width.
When the model is created it seeds randomly both the clus-
ter mean locations and a matrix of variances for each cluster.
The EM algorithm iteration then alternates between perform-
ing two steps. The Expectation step calculates, based on the
current estimate of the mean and variance for each cluster, the
expected value a log-likelihood function that describes the like-
lihood that the current position of the Gaussian distributions is a
correct representation of the observed data. The Maximization
step then chooses the values for means and variances that max-
imize this log-likelihood function. This log-likelihood function
of the new distributions is then calculated and the cycle contin-
ues until the a maximum value is reached.
Rather than being hard-assigned to a cluster, the probability
Fig. 6. Comparison of K-Means and EM clustering models over 20 ﬂights
of a new sample belonging to each system cluster is calculated,
and the sample is then assigned to the cluster to which it is most
likely to belong. This means that the acceptance rate of clusters
with relatively tight groupings is much lower than in k-means
clustering and should provide a lower rate of false-negatives.
Figure 5 demonstrates this improvement by overlaying the re-
sults from EM clustering on the same data as before.
4.5. Model Testing
The data from the training sets were used to assemble nine
labelled clusters in the four normalized variables. One clus-
ter represented the data behaving normally and the other eight
clusters represented diﬀerent types of labelled fault.
Both models, one based on k-means and one based on E-M
clustering, were tested on 20 sets of ﬂight data. All ﬂights fol-
lowed the same pattern, taking oﬀ from runway 27L at Lon-
don Heathrow (EGLL) airport and following a standard in-
strument departure (SID) path before setting on a course for
New York JFK (KJFK). Once the airspeed had settled at 210kts
and an altitude of 5000ft had been reached data recording be-
gan. The fault-injection window lasted for approximately 5
minutes and contained two faults that fell into six broad cat-
egories, Pitot-Stuck, Pitot-High, Pitot-Low, Static-Stuck Static-
High and Static-Low. These faults were injected at random
times within the window for between 15-30 seconds each.
The results of this testing are shown in Figure 6. The model
based on the EM clustering method, as expected, performed
signiﬁcantly better at fault detection, with an average detec-
tion rate of 96% compared to 84% for the k-means method.
This diﬀerence in performance comes about from the ﬂawed
assumption of the k-means model that clusters in the data have
identical widths, and led to misassignment of faulty data as be-
ing fault-free. This same property lead to the k-means method
performing slightly better in terms of throwing false-positives.
It is expected that the implementation of a sensibly calibrated
low-pass ﬁlter could allow the EM model to ﬁnd an acceptable
balance between false-positive rate and response-time, which
was almost instant when analysing data on a sample-by-sample
basis.
Of faults that were detected the EM model correctly iden-
tiﬁed the faulty system (pitot/static) in 95% cases and the pre-
cise nature of the fault (high, stuck etc) in 89%. The k-means
method performed poorly in this area. Once faults had fully
manifested it provided the correct categorisation, but in the in-
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terim period it failed to deliver good results, on average deliver-
ing 80% system categorisation and classifying the nature of the
fault 62% of the time.
The self-healing model was similar for both methods. When
faults were isolated the system used Var1 - Var4 to provide al-
ternative instrument readings for those instruments deemed to
be faulty. Both methods performed extremely well here, de-
livering alternative IAS, Altimeter readings with 98% of the
correct value and and VSI readings within 90% of the true
value. While these results seem very positive the GPS system
in FlightGear is overly accurate and this could be going some
way towards providing these excellent results.
5. Conclusions and Further Discussion
This paper ﬁnds that FlightGear provides detailed simulation
of many areas of aircraft avionics. In particular the fundamen-
tal ﬂight instruments are modelled accurately and in a detailed
manner. It concludes that in these areas FlightGear can be a
useful tool for testing and visualising methods of real-time fault
detection and diagnosis.
FlightGear does not have suﬃciently realistic modelling of
engine thrust control to carry out fault-analysis in this area. An
XML or Nasal-based implementation of a control system sim-
ilar to a simple FADEC, monitoring engine and environmental
parameters while actuating fuel-ﬂow, would introduce the ex-
tra layer of abstraction necessary to fault-test electronic engine
faults and could provide interesting results.
5.1. Fault-Detection and Self-Healing
The goal of the Fault-Detection and Self-Healing experi-
mentation was to explore the possibility of creating an Autopilot
Supervisor that provides a layer of software-redundancy in the
case that physical or non-recoverable electrical fault causes a
system to become unreliable. The suggested model, based on
an Expectation-Maximization clustering approach, detects 96%
of faults and has a false-positive rate of 1.5%. The self-repair
system implemented provides very accurate results. While this
is partly due to an over accurate GPS implementation it demon-
strates that the methods are sound. However, due to the limited
testing (only 20 ﬂights worth of data was tested). While this
model is an improvement on no error-detection at all a complete
solution needs further study. Signiﬁcantly more fault-types and
ﬂight situations must be explored before this model could be
described as a reliable Autopilot Supervisor.
In terms of improving the model a number of the false-
positives detected were a result of system noise causing data en-
tries to cross cluster boundaries. Many engine and inertial (ac-
celerometers) system variables showed promising correlations
with various system instrumentation. By reconciling more in-
struments into normalized variables the diversity of the solution
space will be increased more system cross-checks provided. Ul-
timately this will create a more complete picture of the system
and should allow for faults to be characterised more accurately
and reliably.
5.2. Hardware-in-the-Loop
FlightGear shows enormous promise as a test-bed for hard-
ware fault-injection. Rather than extracting only the pitot-tube
subroutine, it could be possible to extract multiple subroutines
to FPGAs, or even use real aircraft components in the loop,
providing a rigorous and exciting testing environment. Further
testing of system performance under hardware fault-injection
should be carried out and the performance at software level of
hardware self-healing methods characterised.
If combined with a top-down software based approach the
hardware route could help pave the way to a complete suite of
fault-detection and self-healing methods. Providing a hybrid
top-down and bottom-up approach to fault-detection and self-
healing that could lead to improved component resilience and
ultimately lower costs and higher levels of safety in aircraft.
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